

BARRAGE-FIRE
AGAINST
TREATY ON THE
NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS

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*A Documentation
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the German Democratic Republic*

Verlag Zeit im Bild, GDR – 801 Dresden
Layout: Verlag Zeit im Bild, Graphic Department
Translation: Intertext, GDR – 108 Berlin
Printed by Grafischer Großbetrieb Völkerfreundschaft Dresden
Printed in the German Democratic Republic
492/67 – 2

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The discovery of the practical use of atomic energy is one of the great achievements of human cognition. But the discoverers already foresaw that the blessing could easily become a mortal curse. Those atomic bombs of the USA which extinguished life in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 confirmed these fears in a horrible way.

Consequently, the struggle to ban atomic weapons and the destruction of all hitherto existing stocks became a chief target of all peace-loving people and states in the world.

As early as June 1946, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted to the United Nations the draft of an international convention on the prohibition of the production and employment of atomic weapons and the destruction of all stocks within three months.

With many further initiatives, proposals and recommendations as well as practical steps, the Soviet Union and other socialist states – among them the German Democratic Republic–continued these efforts.

In view of the present international situation the prevention of the further spreading of nuclear weapons has received special importance for international relaxation and the lessening of the danger of a nuclear world war.

To contribute to reaching this objective Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, on January 6th 1964 proposed to the West German federal chancellor a treaty on the renunciation by the two German states of nuclear weapons in any form.

On August 24th 1967 the USSR submitted to the world public and all states the draft treaty on a comprehensive and strict ban on the dissemination or acceptance of nuclear weapons. In conformity with its policy which is directed towards peace, European security and international détente, the German Democratic Republic approves of this draft.

Following a Soviet initiative, 110 members of the United Nations appealed in a resolution to all states of the world as early as November 4th 1966, "Until the conclusion of such a treaty a) to take all necessary steps to support and bring about as soon as possible the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons according to the principles fixed in Resolution 2028 (XX) of the General Assembly; b) to refrain from any action which could promote the spreading of nuclear weapons or obstruct the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."

But the West German federal government engages in cross-fire against an international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, since its own intentions and political aims obviously disagree with such a treaty.

With the statements of Bonn politicians themselves, this documentation proves the dangerous and alarming backgrounds of the role of West Germany as an international disturber of the peace.

It reveals the machinations of the Bonn government, its methods and tactics of the obstructive policy directed against peace relaxation.



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I. The Motives of Bonn's Obstructionist Policy against the Treaty

1. Nuclear Weapons as a Means to Enforce the West German Policy of Expansion

An international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which does not leave open any backdoors for access to nuclear weapons hits the Bonn power policy in one of its basic positions. "Nuclear weapons guarantee power," was proclaimed by the Bonn government in a memorandum of April 7th 1967 which comes out against such a treaty.

Entirely in this spirit West German NATO ambassador Wilhelm Grawe stated before the (West) German Society for Foreign Policy on January 24th 1967:

"Nations without their own nuclear weapons will hardly be able in future to play the role of a 'great power'." (*Die Welt*, January 28th 1967)

In the calculations of West German imperialism nuclear weapons constitute an indispensable instrument for the implementation of its aspirations at revenge and hegemony. That is why the idea and the preparation of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty have aroused the bitter and systematically organised opposition of the Bonn government.

Already in his book "Entwurf für Europa" Franz Josef Strauss resolutely opposed the conclusion of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty because it would "cement and legalise to a large extent the status quo in Europe". And, as is known, this especially stands in crass contrast to the strategic objectives of the West German government which have been described by Franz Josef Strauss as follows:

"We cannot in the long run have a Germany which is an economic giant a political dwarf." (Franz Josef Strauss "Entwurf für Europa", Seewald publishers, Stuttgart, 2nd edition 1966, p. 150).

Strauss also outlines the plan how to reach this objective. To begin with, one should "stake everything on the card of a Western European community so that it can be brought into play" (*ibid.*, p. 162) with a view to founding the hegemony of the West German "economic giant" over the whole of Western Europe.

But this will by far not quench first for power of the ruling circles of West Germany. "A united Western Europe shall be the preliminary to the United States of Europe among which I should like to see included also all peoples of Central and Eastern Europe." (*ibid.*, p. 26)

About the consequences arising from such a policy Franz Josef Strauss writes:

"Every step towards European unity and therefore towards the strengthening and autonomy of Europe will involve a *change in the status quo* (emphasis by the editor) – naturally in favour of the West." (*ibid.*, p. 102)

And elsewhere Strauss writes:

"A determined initiative alone can help to free us from the shackles of the status quo." (*ibid.*, p. 7)

That Strauss formulated in his "Entwurf für Europa" the *official* policy of revenge of the Bonn government was confirmed by Chancellor Kiesinger at his press conference on August 21st this year when he threatened: "We are by no means willing to put up with the situation as it now exists in Europe." Foreign Minister Brandt's demand that one should "level frontiers" in Europe (*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, July 4th 1967) also corresponds to these objectives.

The ruling circles of the West German Federal Republic openly admit that the “determined initiative” proclaimed by Strauss conjures up war.

Ernst Majonica, chairman of the foreign political working group of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, wrote about these “very far-reaching foreign political targets”:

“Reunification means a radical change in the balance of power as it has emerged since the end of World War II.... Only seldom have the results of a war been subsequently corrected by peaceful means.” (*Politisch-Soziale Korrespondenz*, Bonn, 1966, No. 1)

Thus it becomes entirely clear what West German Chancellor Kiesinger had in mind when stating, in connection with the discussion about the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, that he was “concerned about what impact such a treaty would have on the pending task of reunification”. (*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, January 3rd 1967)

That one has in mind not only the annexation of the GDR, was admitted by the West German CDU deputy to the Bundestag, Marx, in the 2nd programme of the West German television on August 24th 1967:

“A sensible, a continuous, a steady Eastern policy is possible only if it goes hand in hand with military power.”

Therefore, the principle that “the Bundeswehr has nuclear delivery systems” must be upheld.

The responsible politicians of West Germany press for nuclear arms as they consider them an indispensable prerequisite for their far-reaching expansionist aims. That is why they oppose, by every means, any settlement designed to preclude the further spreading of nuclear arms.

2. Bonn's Ways to Obtain Control over Nuclear Arms

While the politicians in Bonn, resorting to a great variety of ways and means, are trying to thwart the realization of an atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty, they feverishly continue their efforts to obtain control over nuclear arms through *various* channels.

NATO's Part in the West German Drive for Nuclear Weapons

One stage on the way to control over nuclear arms is West Germany's membership in the so-called NATO nuclear committee.

Already at an early stage it was pointed out by authoritative West German quarters, i.e. the then chancellor Erhard, that they would not be content with this:

“The negotiations in the NATO nuclear committee of defence ministers are concerned with another aspect of the participation of nuclear states, they are not, however, *a compensation for a nuclear settlement* of a joint nature within NATO.” (emphasis by the editor) (*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, March 1st 1966)

The then chairman of the West German so-called Federal Defence Council, Dr. Heinrich Krone, made it even clearer:

"We are members of the 'Special Committee' – the so-called McNamara Committee and cooperate in it. This gives us a chance to obtain information which is important for us. This cooperation furthermore allows us *to inspire understanding for our view*. This cannot, however, be called co-determination (on nuclear weapons – the editor) so that essential and quite legitimate *wishes of the Federal Republic in the field of co-determination continue to remain open.*" (emphasis by the editor) (*Stuttgarter Zeitung*, August 29th 1966)

That is why the present West German government – as early as one day after Kiesinger's policy statement – insisted on "more far-reaching solutions" at the Paris NATO Council meeting in December 1966. It was resolved there to establish – in addition to two gremiums with the misleading names of 'Committee for Defence Planning' and 'Committee for Nuclear Defence' – a standing 'Nuclear Planning Group' which provides the West German government with information on what nuclear arms are available, their storage areas, command regulations on their use, and target planning. But, it is stressed in Bonn again and again that this solution, too, can be but an intermediary stage on the way towards West Germany's actual control over nuclear arms. West German war minister Schroeder stated point-blank that the Federal Republic's membership in the Nuclear Planning Group

"meant no renunciation of more far-reaching practical and constructive solutions".
(DPA, December 14th 1966)

What Schroeder understands by such solutions he already made clear at the first session of the Planning Group. As the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of April 10th 1967 reported, a "(West) German- (emphasis by the editor) Turkish-Italian advance" was made at the session to "shorten the procedure for the use of small nuclear arms e.g. landmines etc. by conferring in advance the authority to use these arms upon the responsible NATO offices", i.e. the power of command over nuclear arms is to be transferred from the US President to the NATO commanders.

The West German Federal Republic would get direct access to nuclear arms through its military men in high NATO command posts, first of all through the commander of the NATO Command Central Europe (AFCENT), West German General von Kielmannsegg, within whose area of command the bulk of the nuclear arms stationed in Europe are stockpiled.

The "European Nuclear Strike Force"

Bonn's politicians devote great attention to a "multilateral solution". After many years of fruitless efforts for the MLF project they are now driving at a European Nuclear Strike Force which at present seems to them a form of satisfying their nuclear ambitions.

"I have never left it open to any doubt that I would welcome, as a long-term objective, the forming of a European nuclear strike force." (Franz Josef Strauss, quoted after *Der Spiegel*, Hamburg, No. 1/2 of January 2nd 1967)

Strauss also indicates for what the West German side presses so very hard for the "European solution".

"Already now Europe's industrial capacity is tremendous and still can be considerably increased by economic integration, rationalisation and concentration. The existence

side by side of nation-state potentials is not enough. Their integration is more than addition . . . Free Europe has more than 2 million soldiers at her disposal and in England and in France a *nuclear potential . . .*" (emphasis by the editor) (F. J. Strauss, "Entwurf für Europa", Stuttgart 1966, p. 29)

Of course Strauss integrates – silently though for the time being – the West German nuclear potential into this Anglo-French one. Strauss proceeds from the assumption that the West German Federal Republic, due to its powerful economic and also specifically nuclear resources, would win the hegemony of a Western Europe integrated to such a comprehensive extent.

Integrated Western Europe under the economic, political and also nuclear patronage of the West German Federal Republic is to become independent, primarily with regard to the control over and use of nuclear arms, so that they can act at their own discretion and set about liquidating the status quo.

In any circumstances they want to keep open the way to a "Europe" integrated to such a comprehensive extent – even in the nuclear field. That is why the foreign affairs spokesman of the West German CDU leadership, Majonica, categorically declared:

"A treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear arms precluding a future multilateral or a European solution is just unacceptable for the Federal Republic." (Deutscher Bundestag, 5th legislative period – 31st session, Bonn, March 17th 1966)

Bonn's Nuclear Conspiracy with Other States

It is with the racist regime in South Africa and with aggressive Israel that West Germany's nuclear conspiracy has gone farthest. As regards West Germany's cooperation with South Africa in the nuclear field, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the GDR has already exposed it this year convincingly in its memorandum "The Alliance Bonn-Preatoria".

As early as 1958 Dr. A. J. A. Roux, head of the South African delegation to the international nuclear conference in Geneva, visited the management of the leading West German nuclear trust Degussa and offered, among other things, the sale of uranium concentrate. They finally came "to terms".

On this occasion Roux reiterated that for political and ideological reasons he and his friends would, also in the field of nuclear research and nuclear technology, prefer closer connections with West Germany to connections with any other country. Roux submitted an offer for far-reaching cooperation which was later negotiated on behalf of the West German nuclear commission by Ministerial Director Dipl. Eng. Karl Kaißling, at that time head of department III – nuclear research – in the nuclear ministry.

The ruling circles of South Africa, too, try to get hold of nuclear arms. In March 1965 South African war minister Fouché announced that the government of South Africa had obtained "from a Western government" the licence "to produce in South Africa a most modern type of bomb". (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 27th 1965)

On August 5th of the same year the then South African head of government, Verwoerd, stated at a ceremony marking the putting into operation of the first South African nuclear reactor that it was

"of course South Africa's duty to think notonly of the military (!)use of the material . . ." (*South African Digest*, Pretoria, August 13th 1965)

South Africa is regarded by West German imperialism as an ideal partner of the implementation of its nuclear arms plans. South Africa possesses the largest known uranium deposits in the world and produces already now 20 per cent of the uranium of the capitalist world. West Germany which has only minor uranium deposits can, in exchange for uranium, supply South Africa with production units in which uranium ore can be dressed to become fissionable material for military use. The final aim of this cooperation is the joint production of nuclear arms in South Africa.

At present Israel plays a no less important part in the nuclear calculations of West German policy. For years a sizable portion of West German funds for Israel has been flowing into the Israeli nuclear research centre, the "Weizmann Institut", where already now 19 scientific projects are being carried out with West German financial support and the cooperation of West German scientists. Also for the future enormous sums are earmarked for a so-called nuclear loan, representing the West German share in the financing of a nuclear plant in the Negev desert. In this plant pure plutonium suitable for the production of atomic bombs will be obtained as a by-product.

The military conspiracy between West Germany and Israel entered into by Adenauer and Ben Gurion in 1960 and continued primarily by Strauss is being carried on now as before. This can be learnt even from reports in the West German press which is very uncommunicative in these questions.

"Foreign Office diplomats negotiated discreetly with Israels ..." (*Der Spiegel*, Hamburg, No. 10, February 27th 1967)

It is a fact that under a secret agreement on military cooperation, West Germany has stepped up particularly the joint nuclear research work with Israel. Under the secret agreement concluded between Konrad Adenauer and Ben Gurion in March 1960, the West German Federal Republic did not only deliver additional 320 million DM worth of airplanes, tanks, torpedo-boats with rocket launching pads, guns and other weapons, and did not only train 5 thousand Israeli officers and soldiers, but also intensified its participation in Israel's nuclear and bacteriological "research".

On the Road to an Own West German Nuclear Arms Production

West Germany's preparations for manufacturing nuclear weapons of her own have been and continue to be carried on systematically, both in the scientifico-technical and the political fields.

"In this time Federal Chancellor Adenauer called the attention of Secretary of State Dulles to the fact that the (West-) German renunciation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, like other contractual obligations, (of the WEU treaty – the editor) was subject to the 'clausula rebus sic stantibus', that is a rule of law according to which a performance to be carried out under a contract (or an omission to be observed) could no longer be demanded if the circumstances underlying the conclusion of the contract have changed to such an extent that fulfilment of the contract can no longer be expected." (*Die Welt*, Hamburg, March 3rd 1967)

Already today the ruling circles of West Germany regard the conditions under which

the West German renunciation of a nuclear arms production in West Germany was pronounced at least as no longer sufficiently given.

This was officially confirmed by the so-called disarmament commissioner of the West German government in a speech delivered in the Frankfurt "America House" on February 15th and transmitted by the Frankfurt broadcasting station on February 18th 1967. Schnippenkötter, who called West Germany a "potential nuclear power", declared that it was becoming

"more difficult for (West) Germany to adhere in the long run to the renunciation of nuclear armament and the acquisition of nuclear arms which was proclaimed government policy by the federal government".

The impatience of the proponents of West German nuclear armament is explicable in view of their far advanced preparations. In a televised interview on February 13th 1967 Mr. Weizsäcker, well-known West German nuclear scientist, confirmed the statement of TV commentator Sommer that by the end of this decade the Federal Republic will have three reactors "which will produce sufficient plutonium for about three dozen atom-bombs every year."

This enormous development of the West German nuclear potential did not come over night. At the bottom of it is the political big-power conception of the ruling circles in West Germany about which Prof. Dr. Siegfried Balke, former West German atomic minister, wrote as early as five years ago:

"A glance at the dry facts shows... that the extension of the possession of nuclear arms to countries other than the present nuclear powers cannot be prevented. Although the production of nuclear arms requires economic, technological, financial and other preconditions which are hard to create, it would be self-deception to assume that where there is a will to possess atomic weapons there were no ways to attain this goal." (S. Balke, Vernunft in dieser Zeit – Der Einfluß von Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft und Technik auf unser Leben, Duesseldorf/Vienna 1962, p. 183)

Even at this stage the centrally organised West German nuclear industry, controlled by the Federal Ministry for Scientific Research in Bonn and subsidized with huge sums, meets all "preconditions" mentioned for "extending possession of nuclear arms".

II. Bonn's Cross-fire against a Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Bonn government has developed an entire programme to prevent the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, or at least to impede or delay it or to make the treaty ineffective. With a large number of objections the Bonn government attacks the treaty project. From time to time it changes the focal points of its resistance so as not to be unmasked. Objections which are too manifest, whose untenability is too obvious, which met with no international response or which too clearly revealed the real motives of the West German obstruction against the treaty disappeared without a trace completely or temporarily, and others were shifted to the foreground.

Thus, for example, the "vital interests" of the West German government in the public campaign waged by it were subject to constant changes. Firstly it was said that the "European atomic strike force" was of "vital interest"; then it was problems in the "field of science and technology" and in the field of "security", later the "question of control" and the "connection of non-proliferation with disarmament", and finally it is the "limitation in time of the treaty" and the "review clause".

The steady exchange of allegations up to the conversion into the contrary alone proves that Bonn only intends to frustrate the possible treaty. Any dishonest means is good for this purpose.

At present the Bonn government is also calculating on the possibility that the worldwide approval to such a treaty cannot be prevented. It therefore tries to ensure by all means that the treaty leaves open backdoors for access to nuclear weapons so that instead of banning the spreading of nuclear weapons it would simply legalize it. Bonn speculates that a treaty undermined in this way would either not come into existence at all or would be ineffective in practice.

A summary and inquiry of the most important objections made by Bonn clearly proves the policy of obstruction of the West German government.

1. "Escape Clauses" as a Detour to Nuclear Weapons

In view of the state of the present international discussion on the atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty the Bonn government raises the demand for a "review clause" and for a "limitation in time of the treaty".

Deputy West German press chief Ahlers declared on August 24th 1967 that the West German government raises general reservations with regard to "modifications of the treaty" and to "the duration of validity of the treaty" which must be limited in time.

As early as on April 27th 1967 West German Foreign Minister Brandt had indicated before the West German Bundestag:

"It will also be important for judging the results (of the Soviet-American talks on the treaty – editor) what duration of validity is foreseen for such a treaty, how it is to be carried through and how it can be adapted to the further international development." (Deutscher Bundestag, 5th electoral period, 106th session, April 27th 1967)

Trust representative Birrenbach emphasized before the West German Bundestag that “the idea of limiting the duration of validity of the treaty is of special importance”. He connected the demand for the limitation of the period of validity of the treaty and for a review clause with attacks against the universal character of a non-proliferation treaty:

“On examining the treaty the thought suggests itself of whether a universal treaty is the suitable means for this purpose... when one thinks of later changes of the text of the treaty. If the obligation stipulated by this treaty would have to be taken over only within the framework of the alliance one could be sure that any fundamental change... could be corrected in friendly agreement. This is not possible within the framework of a universal treaty. Regional problems can scarcely be solved in a world-wide framework.” (Deutscher Bundestag, 5th electoral period, 106th session, Bonn, April 27th 1967)

Thus the prominent CDU politician wanted to deprive the majority of states of the right to share in making decisions on questions of atomic disarmament. Later changes in the treaty in favour of West German access to nuclear weapons could then be realized more easily “in friendly agreement”. When a treaty cannot be prevented, then the ruling circles in Bonn would rather like to take over “obligations within the alliance”, that is, within the framework of the aggressive NATO pact or the Western European Union (WEU). The *Frankfurter Allgemeine* of August 25th 1967 sneeringly called “all other signatures nothing but statistical material”. The “obligations and arms limitations” within the framework of the WEU, however, have, as is known, not prevented the West German government from re-arming. Those “obligations” have never been examined and, moreover, were reduced step by step.

These demands for “escape clauses” are very closely connected with the demand for “political benevolence”, that means for acceptance of the aggressive and revanchist claims of the Bonn government by the signatory states of the atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty to be concluded.

The Bonn “Memorandum” states on this:

“In the sphere of application of the treaty the participating states should consider their mutual relations as relieved (and) renounce mutual accusations in this sphere.” (*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, May 19th 1967)

During his visit to Washington Kiesinger tried to assert the West German demand for an “escape clause” with Johnson.

He stressed in an interview with the American television on August 20th 1967:

“There could be inserted a clause, for example, that in case of such policy on the part of an atomic power (meaning a “lack of benevolence” – editor) there is the possibility of withdrawing from and denouncing the treaty.” (*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, August 22nd 1967)

Thus the West German government also tries to make its joining a non-proliferation treaty which meets its “conditions” a swapping object for the realization of other demands. The aggressive sole representation pretension, for example, is to be tolerated by other states in the future, Bonn’s refusal to recognize the territorial status quo in Europe and Bonn’s territorial demands on other states are to be considered as normal, and the role of the West German government as disturber of the peace with all efforts

for international relaxation is to be tolerated. In short, the signatory states of the atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty are to be prevented from pointing to the threat to peace emanating from West Germany. The European states would have to "consider their relations" with West Germany "as relieved" although the West German government continues to pursue its policy of expansion and revenge. If the other states do not fulfil these conditions, the West German government wants to have the possibility of withdrawing from the treaty.

Thus it is fully clear that the West German government does not agree to the terms of withdrawal as contained in the Soviet draft treaty since they do not permit a withdrawal from the treaty by adducing the interests of Bonn's policy of expansion.

Article VII of the draft treaty says:

"This treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of withdrawal to all other parties to the treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests." (*Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, August 26th 1967)

The West German demand for a "limitation in time of the treaty" and for a "review clause", respectively, clearly aims at keeping West Germany's access to nuclear weapons open at a later date which seems more favourable to the West German government.

At the same time, this demand aims at obstructing and delaying the current talks in Geneva. The West German Foreign Minister Brandt confirmed this in a radio interview on August 16th 1967 by saying that one has arrived "not at the end of a development but at the beginning of the debate proper . . ."

2. Social and National Demagogery

In the campaign against the treaty the ruling circles of West Germany stir up nationalist moods in the West German population. At the same time they unscrupulously utilize the social insecurity in West Germany to produce the conception that approval of the treaty would condemn West Germany to the role of an underdeveloped state. The statements of West German politicians show a close spiritual relationship with the demands of Hitler for "equality" and "national greatness" and with the Hitlerite thesis that Germany must first be armed before one could talk about disarmament.

On May 17th 1933 Hitler paraphrased his demands for armament and the rejection of arms limitations as follows:

"By no means will the German government let itself be forced to sign what would perpetuate the disqualification of Germany." (*Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, 8th electoral period 1933, Berlin, vol. 457, page 50)

In February 1967 Adenauer described the treaty on the non-proliferation of atomic arms in Madrid as a "devilish revised edition of the Morgenthau Plan", according to

a DPA report. "The Federal Republic," the former head of the Bonn government said, "will not be prepared to sign its own death sentence".

West German Minister of Finance Franz Josef Strauss, the "strong man" of the West German monopolies in the federal government, said in talks with British Prime Minister Wilson and his Foreign Secretary Brown:

"I am an opponent of that agreement and I may tell you that I shall fight against it... That is a renewed Versailles, and one of cosmic dimensions." (*Der Spiegel*, Hamburg, No. 9, February 20th 1967)

The psychological campaign against the treaty in West Germany is characterized by the fact that all official sources and most West German publications always speak of an "Atom Ban Treaty" instead of an "Atomic Weapons Ban Treaty". This is intended to convey the impression that the aim was not to ensure the non-proliferation of atomic weapons, but exclusion from the peaceful utilization of atomic energy.

The president of the Federation of German Industry, Berg, (the federation is the most influential West German monopoly organization) stated, for instance, that the conclusion of the treaty would mean "the exclusion of the Federal Republic of Germany from research of importance for the future". Qualified scientists would have to migrate and one could calculate when the Federal Republic would be thrown back to the level of an agricultural state. "For this reason", Berg added, "the whole of German industry is following the discussions around the atomic non-proliferation treaty with the utmost anxiety". (*AP*, February 11th 1967)

Rainer Barzel, chairman of the CDU parliamentary group, held up the spectre of mass unemployment in times to come, when on February 16th 1967 he stated on West German television that in the event "of the signature of such a treaty full employment" in West Germany "could not be guaranteed". The West German press, headed by the notorious Springer trust, is making the utmost endeavour to bring popular feelings to the boil. Here are a few headlines:

"No Geneva Dictate for Europe" (*Bayern Kurier*, Munich, January 21th 1967)

"Decisive Interference with National Industrial Development" (*Die Welt*, February 4th 1967)

"The Spirit of Morgenthau?" (*Die Welt am Sonntag*, February 12th 1967)

"We don't want to become a nation of beggars!" (*Bild*, February 13th 1967)

The social and national demagogic of the Bonn government in the campaign against a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is coupled with the idea about "vital interests in the spheres of science and technology", promoted in particular by Foreign Minister Brandt.

West German Chancellor Kiesinger stated at a press conference on January 16th 1967: "There are economic interests involved in this connection. You, too, will surely be aware that the development of nuclear arms brings with it a multiplicity of by-products promoting the economic development of a country." (*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, January 18th 1967)

Wilhelm Grewe stated:

"Nations without their own production of nuclear weapons will not be able to keep pace in their economic and technical development with those who themselves develop and produce nuclear weapons." (*Die Welt*, January 28th 1967)

Brandt, speaking before the West German Bundestag on February 1st 1967, emphasized:

"Independently of the ban regulation the question arises as to whether and how far the renunciation of the military utilization of nuclear energy could have a detrimental effect on nuclear developments for civil purposes." (Deutscher Bundestag, 5th electoral period, 90th session, Bonn, February 1st 1967)

These statements are simply contrary to the truth. The proposed general prohibition of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is in no way directed against the peaceful research and utilization of atomic energy. That, of course, is also well known in Bonn. Members of the Bonn government have in the meantime been obliged to acknowledge that hypocrisy. In reply to the question: "How high do you estimate the use of waste products of military atomic research for civil developments?" the West German Minister for Scientific Research, Stoltenberg, stated: "Rather insignificant... In general the useful proportion of the surplus from the purely military domain is very insignificant, and its importance is frequently overestimated." (*Der Spiegel*, No. 10, February 27th 1967)

The members of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee emphasized on every occasion that the treaty must not be allowed to obstruct the peaceful utilization and research in all spheres of nuclear energy.

Accordingly, Article IV of the Soviet draft treaty of August 24th 1967 reads:

"Nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this treaty, as well as the right of the parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." (*Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, August 26th 1967)

The assertion of the West German government that the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear arms was obstructing technical and scientific progress is intended as a means of whipping up the public feeling in West Germany and in the world against the treaty, to steer discussions along nationalist lines and to divert attention from the political requirements of a non-proliferation treaty.

3. The Attacks against All Control

The "concern about scientific and technical advance" has increasingly been interwoven with other aspects, in particular with the so-called control question.

The "Principles of the Federal Government on the Question of Non-Proliferation" contain the statement: the federal government "will above all take care to ensure that control measures should not become an impediment to German scientific research and economic utilization in this sphere". (*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, February 22nd 1967)

These remarks are in the first place directed against control by IAEA*) and are aimed at the preservation of the system of EURATOM self-control.

The West German "Memorandum" therefore continues:

"The control system should effectively check up on the regulations governing non-proliferation, without entailing any burdens or disadvantages. Already existing, tested control systems should not be obstructed in their effectiveness." (*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, May 19th 1967)

The West German objections to the extent of control and also against the control organ are basically dictated by the fear that control by the IAEA might block the loop-holes to the production of nuclear weapons in West Germany. It is generally known that the West German Federal Republic disposes of the technical, scientific, financial and personnel prerequisites for the production of its own nuclear weapons.

In an analysis of West German nuclear research, W. B. Bader, adviser on international affairs of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, drew the following conclusion in the official periodical *Foreign Affairs*:

"West German advances in nuclear technology... arouse the impression that the (West) Germans are laying the foundations for an arms program... If the present plans were materialized, West Germany could within a few years become not only one of the leading competitors in the sphere of commercial nuclear technology, but could also produce a bomb within a very short time." (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Munich, June 22nd 1966)

Control by EURATOM which, in fact, amounts to self-control instead of a universal control by IAEA could not guarantee the observance of regulations laid down within a non-proliferation treaty.

Control would become senseless and thus superfluous if conducted by regional organizations, which, by their composition and political objectives, are clearly directed towards the maintenance of existing political and military alliances. In addition there is the inadequate competency of the control system of EURATOM, as is clearly revealed in an interview by *Die Tat* (Frankfurt-on-Main, March 4th 1967) with a representative of the EURATOM control system:

Question: "How is security controlled in accordance with article 7 of the EURATOM treaty?"

Answer: "Twelve inspectors are authorized to visit all works of the six member countries. The investigation system envisages that each nuclear plant must submit regular written reports on its activities. If new nuclear plants are constructed, the scientific and technical data are submitted to EURATOM, with the exception of military installations. In that case the government concerned announces its intention to set up a military installation."

*) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was founded in 1956. Its aim is the promotion of international cooperation in the sphere of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Its headquarters are in Vienna. Ninety-eight states belong to the IAEA. The executive organ of the IAEA, the Council of Governors, is composed of 25 member states. The Council at present includes among its members the Soviet Union, Poland, Yugoslavia, India, Japan, Mexico, France, the USA, Great Britain, but also West Germany and the South African Republic. The European Atomic Community (EURATOM), on the other hand, is an organization of the EEC member states for cooperation in the utilization of nuclear energy.

Question: "Does Article 84 of the EURATOM treaty not permit the control of military purposes?"

Answer: "Our control extends to the doorstep of military installations. From the point at which a nuclear plant is under military authority, its control is no longer our affair."

It becomes clear that the government of the West German Federal Republic would like to exclude from the very beginning an effective international control in case of an international treaty on the non-proliferation of atomic weapons being concluded. That is why it, as a precaution, clings to the system of EURATOM which, in fact, amounts to self-control, i.e. non-control – in case control measures cannot be avoided.

4. Disarmament and Relaxation Demagogery

The West German government has so far rejected every constructive general and detailed disarmament proposal. Yet in connection with the non-proliferation treaty it suddenly appears in the garb of the great protagonists of disarmament. It even goes as far as to claim "that the Federal Republic of Germany

is the only state in the community of nations which has made some advances in this sphere" . . .

(*"Principles of the Federal Government on the Question of the Non-Proliferation of Atomic Weapons," Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, February 22nd 1967)

In its "Memorandum" of April 7th 1967 it stated that it had

"ultimately renounced the production of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons already on October 3rd 1954 and submitted to relevant controls,"

thereby "having made concrete contributions towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the limitation of armaments. Other states have so far not followed this example by similar moves." (*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, May 19th 1967)

The "Memorandum" did not mention that this declaration was made in connection with the admission of West Germany to the Western European Union and to NATO, with a view to evading the far more comprehensive armament limitations provided by the Potsdam Agreement and other allied post-war stipulations, forging ahead with West German rearmament in breach of those provisions. The West German government was not forbidden by the NATO states to acquire nuclear arms, to produce them outside of West Germany and to use nuclear arms or to train the West German army in the use of nuclear arms. Nor did the West German government at all renounce these possibilities in its "Letter of Renunciation". West German Chancellor Kiesinger hinted at these multiple possibilities in an interview granted to the (West) German television on February 17th 1967:

"In the agreement on the Western European Union we renounced the *production of atomic weapons on our own territory*."

An important addendum frequently omitted by West Germany – also omitted in the West German "Memorandum"!

Kiesinger continued:

"In this new treaty which would then have to be signed very much more would have to be renounced, thus for instance, the somewhat theoretical case of producing atomic weapons on the territory of other countries, or of producing them with other countries or another country; this includes the renunciation of the acceptance of nuclear weapons which an existing nuclear power might be prepared to give us; nor can it be denied that from a legal point of view the commitment goes very much further . . ." (*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, February 21st 1967)

The renunciation of the production of atomic weapons on West German territory cited by Bonn does not, moreover, say anything in regard to practice. In a report of the Committee of Defence and Armament of the WEU dated April 13th 1965 to the WEU Assembly it was stated that the armament control office of the WEU had never yet checked up on the observance of this "renunciation", although West Germany has important civil nuclear research plants which in 1965 produced about 250 kilograms of plutonium.

From this we may conclude:

the statement of the West German government of October 3rd 1954 is by no means a "contribution towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons"; it merely serves the West German government as a pretext for rejecting effective disarmament measures and for concealing the West German production of nuclear weapons at present in preparation.

The "Memorandum" of the West German government, at the same time that it rejected the non-proliferation treaty, calls for "more comprehensive solutions":

"The world cannot stop at a limited non-proliferation treaty. It needs more comprehensive solutions." (*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, May 19th 1967)

It is not difficult to recognize the hypocritical nature of this assertion. It is known that the Soviet Union has submitted several plans for general and complete disarmament, in which the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes only one measure out of many.

On September 15th 1960 the GDR Government proposed to carry through in stages general and complete disarmament in the two German states. The first stage already envisaged that:

"Both German states renounce nuclear armament. They pledge themselves not to produce any nuclear weapons or rockets or to participate in their manufacture in other states or to acquire or accept such arms, nor to take part in nuclear tests conducted by other states.

The stationing of more foreign nuclear weapons is discontinued without delay. Both German states undertake not to produce any chemical or bacteriological weapons, not to acquire or accept such weapons nor participate in tests with such weapons in other states." (UNO Document A/4504, September 23rd 1960)

Since the implementation of the program of general and complete disarmament has so far been prevented by opposition on the part of several NATO states, in particular by West Germany, international disarmament efforts have been concentrating increasingly on the elaboration of partial and relaxation measures. But the West German

government also rejected the numerous proposals submitted by the GDR on the renunciation by both German states of nuclear weapons in any form independent of whether or not the international disarmament talks continue. To this very day the West German government has shown the same intransigent attitude with regard to its participation in a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

The creation of nuclear-free zones is explicitly supported in the Soviet draft treaty, too. Its preamble says:

“that nothing in this treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” (*Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, August 26th 1967)

Furthermore, the draft treaty declares the intention “to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race.”

The treaty calls upon all states to contribute towards achieving this aim. The preamble says that the treaty is to

“facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” (*Ibidem*)

In view of these facts the West German disarmament assertions brought forward against a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are mere hypocrisy.

5. Hypocrisy with the “Vital Interests in the Field of Security”

On January 4th 1967 federal press chief von Hase stated with regard to the treaty:

“The security of the non-nuclear powers must remain guaranteed.” (*UPI*, January 4th 1967)

It is said in the “Principles of the Federal Government on the Question of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”: “It (the federal government) furthermore thinks that this treaty must consider and guarantee by contract . . . the justified, vital interests of the non-nuclear powers in the field of security.” (*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, February 22nd 1967)

On this question, too, the West German government tries to pass itself off as a part of a bloc of non-nuclear states with the same interests. But there are no general “security interests of non-nuclear states”. The situation of West Germany in this respect differs fundamentally from that of many other states.

Nobody threatens West Germany; the situation is the other way round: due to the Bonn government's sticking to the policy of revenge, to territorial demands towards other European states and to its striving for nuclear weapons the West German Federal Republic has become a focus of danger to the peace in Europe and the security of the European peoples. In this dangerous policy it relies on its membership in the military pact of NATO. Furthermore, several thousand nuclear warheads are stationed on West German territory.

The interests of peace and security of the European nations and not least of the

population of West Germany itself demand in the first place that the West German Federal Republic renounces the policy of revenge and access to nuclear weapons.

Already in the appeal of 18 Göttingen professors of April 14th 1957 it is stated:

"We believe that today a small country like the Federal Republic protects itself best and promotes world peace when it renounces the possession of all kinds of nuclear weapons emphatically and voluntarily."

In the interests of all European peoples it is also necessary to withdraw the American atomic warheads from West German territory. Substantial progress would have been made with regard to peace and security in Europe had the West German government agreed to the draft treaty between the Government of the GDR and the Government of the West German Federal Republic on a comprehensive renunciation by both German states of nuclear weapons, draft submitted by the GDR Government more than three years ago, namely on January 6th 1964. Article 2 of the draft says:

"1. The Parties to the Treaty appeal to all States to respect the obligations undertaken in Article 1 of the present Treaty and to withdraw such nuclear weapons as they may maintain on German territory."

"2. The Parties to the Treaty shall endeavour to obtain guarantees from the Member States of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty and from the United Nations to the effect that the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany will be respected as areas permanently free of nuclear weapons, against which nuclear weapons may on no account be used." (*Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, January 16th 1964)

The West German government rejected these proposals and all other suggestions of the GDR which were designed to guarantee peace and security.

Well then, what do the ruling circles in Bonn understand by guaranteeing security?

Obviously they see in it nothing but a pretext for their striving after nuclear weapons in the interests of their expansionist policy.

West German war minister Schröder justified the atomic armament of the Federal Republic with these words:

"... Proposals which are aimed at confining the military task of the Bundeswehr to the conventional sphere, for example, through a 'division of labour' in the alliance, are incompatible with our security interests and the obligations resulting from them under the given circumstances." (*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, April 27th 1967)

Deputy Dr. Birrenbach declared for the CDU/CSU parliamentary group of the Bundestag during the Bundestag debate of April 27th 1967:

"... The renunciation of nuclear weapons and the right of nuclear collective self-defence places upon the non-nuclear states a loss of independent security which is as significant as it is permanent." (Deutscher Bundestag, 5th electoral period, 106th session, Bonn, April 27th 1967)

This shows that the "vital interests" of West Germany "in the field of security" as a circumlocution for aggressive aims are by no means identical with the security interests of other states, but are directed against them.

6. Further Loop-holes to the Access to Nuclear Weapons

“Nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes”

Undoubtedly the possibility exists generally to carry through nuclear explosions also for peaceful purposes. The development of nuclear ignition charges and their possible effects – applied to peaceful purposes – do not differ qualitatively from the development and effect of nuclear weapons, however. A treaty without loop-holes for the access to nuclear weapons must therefore also ban the passing on and production of such ignition charges by states which do not possess nuclear weapons.

During the Bundestag session on February 1st 1967 Foreign Minister Brandt stated indignantly that the non-proliferation treaty even forbids the West German Federal Republic to produce and apply nuclear explosives for the “construction of canals”. (Deutscher Bundestag, 5th electoral period, 90th session, February 1st 1967)

West German “Disarmament Commissioner” Schnippenkötter took up the thread in a lecture on February 18th 1967:

“This treaty text which is being worked out at present . . . gives up the principle of being a mere disarmament-armament control measure by including, even though limited, a field of the civil use of nuclear explosive power.” (Quoted from *Dokumentation der Zeit*, 382/10, 2nd May issue 1967)

Brandt and Schnippenkötter had to take advice from West German nuclear scientist Weizsäcker, who stated on February 13th 1967 in the first program of the West German television:

“The peaceful use of nuclear explosions . . . can hardly ever be of importance to us. I cannot imagine that in the territory of the Federal Republic we could explode a nuclear device to dig a harbour. It doubt whether there are many possibilities in the whole world to make use of them. Anyhow, I find this does not concern us.”

But this did not prevent the West German government from again making itself the champion of the demand for “nuclear ignition charges for peaceful purposes” in the “Memorandum”. Obviously the West German government wants to have a loop-hole to nuclear weapons legalized with this demand.

“Nuclear Anti-Missile Missiles and Tactical Atomic Weapons”

Herr Zimmermann (CSU), chairman of the defence committee of the West German Bundestag, declared in an interview with the *Kölnische Rundschau* on February 19th 1967:

“If the possibility of such an anti-missile missile defence system were also feasible for Europe, Europe could by no means renounce such a protection voluntarily . . . In that case we would also have the sums of thousands of millions available which are necessary for it. But according to the draft treaty which is known to me we are not even allowed to possess such a defence system which is purely defensive.”

Birrenbach, an influential member of the CDU parliamentary group in the Bundestag, demanded on the same problem in the Bundestag:

“We must see that . . . allowance is made for a fundamental change in the field of technology in the sense of the invention of purely defensive anti-missile weapons.” (Deutscher Bundestag, 5th electoral period, 106th session, Bonn, 27th April 1967)

Thus the Bonn politicians set up the thesis that the non-proliferation treaty forbids an anti-missile missile system, but in doing so they conceal the fact that the treaty only forbids systems with nuclear warheads. What really stands behind these “apprehensions” was indicated by the former Hitler General Graf von Kielmannsegg, today commander of the NATO Command Central Europe, in an article in *Christ und Welt* of July 17th 1967:

“... With most weapons it is not they themselves which determine whether they are defensive or offensive but what one does with them I think that the idea of the classification of a few small atomic weapons as defensive weapons, which is also fruitful politically, has not yet been conceived. It should be done.”

III. *The Bonn Tricks for the Organization of an International Fronde against the Treaty*

It is part of the tactics of the West German government that it seeks, through special diplomatic actions towards individual states and by making use of its membership in various West European unions, to win assistance for its obstructive policy and to exploit other states as best witnesses to support Bonn's objections against an atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty.

The Bonn government made special use for this purpose of the recent conferences of the EEC, the EURATOM and of conferences of the NATO nuclear planning group.

These actions are to give greater emphasis to Bonn's negative attitude as well as confirm West Germany in a leading position, as it were. They aim at organizing a world-wide fronde against the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

1. Bonn's Conspiracy against the Treaty in Western European Unions and with Allied States

In their efforts to build road-blocks against the atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty the ruling circles of the West German Federal Republic went as far as blackmailing their NATO partners. Thus the Springer organ *Die Welt* published an article launched by Brandt's main staff (*Der Spiegel*, Hamburg, No. 10, February 27th 1967) in which it was stated that the planned treaty violates Article 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty according to which the member states must not take over any obligations running counter to the Treaty, and Article 3, according to which the alliance partners are obligated to do everything necessary for the "joint defence". The essay concludes with the following challenge:

"The federal government must make it clear to Washington without any doubt *that atomic non-proliferation treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty are incompatible*, whatever may have been the initial settlement by the coalition parties on this matter." (Emphasis by the editor) (*Die Welt*, Hamburg, February 11th 1967)

An instructive proof of the character of the Bonn policy, but also of the character of the NATO!

The British NATO partner was put under especially great pressure by Bonn not to sign an atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty.

Springer's *Berliner Morgenpost* wrote on the same day:

"... Wilson should not be left in any doubt on his visit to Bonn next week that he cannot reckon with a support of his EEC wishes if the British government continues to make itself the advocate of 'non-proliferation' which would not mean anything else for (West) Germany but a stagnation of its future industrial development."

Robert Margulies, representative of West German monopoly capital in EURATOM, was still more outspoken. In Springer's *Bild-Zeitung* he threatened unmistakably:

"England will bar the way to the EEC for itself if it joins the atomic non-proliferation treaty." (*Bild-Zeitung*, West Berlin, February 14th 1967)

As follows from publications of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* of February 5th 1967, Margulies further stated that the conclusion of an atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty was "incompatible with the regulations of the EURATOM treaty", and that it must therefore not be signed by any of the six member states.

The British *Daily Mail* came to the striking conclusion in view of these intrigues on February 21st 1967:

"The (West) Germans . . . resist all attempts to bring about cooperation in the question of an east-west agreement to put a stop to the spreading of nuclear weapons . . ."

The Bonn government rather had again raised its claim to access to nuclear weapons through Professor Hallstein, president of the EEC commission and former state secretary for many years in the West German Foreign Office. On March 16th 1967 Hallstein made a speech before the European Parliament in Strasbourg in which he connected the demand for a political union of Western Europe with a Western European nuclear strike force.

The West German government induced the commission on foreign economic relations of the "European Parliament" to state

"that the planned treaty on the non-proliferation of atomic weapons involves dangers to the EEC." (*Handelsblatt*, July 10th 1967)

A new attack against the atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty and for the realization of Bonn's ambitions for nuclear weapons was made by West German war minister Schröder at the beginning of April 1967 when the so-called nuclear planning group of NATO met in conference in Washington. Springer's *Die Welt* made the following satisfied comment:

"Authoritative (West) German authorities stated with satisfaction already after the first meeting of the group that it fulfils a purpose, more than expected, which the federal government originally tried to realize through the MLF. For (West) Germany, these circles argue, the real attraction of the MLF did not consist in the joint possession of a collective atomic strike force but in the influence which Bonn hoped to win through it on the great nuclear decisions of the alliance. According to the first impression of the German delegation, things seem to be developing in this direction although the planning group was diluted through its being extended to seven members. Beginnings can be perceived now already that the institution could become what originally was hoped from the MLF in Bonn – the starting-point for close bilateral cooperation between Bonn and Washington in the decisive questions of nuclear strategy." (*Die Welt*, Hamburg, April 8th 1967)

While Bonn's war minister Schröder thus attacked the atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty in Washington and openly raised demands for atomic weapons, his social democratic cabinet colleague Brandt set to work in Brussels.

He used the conferences of the councils of ministers of EEC and EURATOM to plot against the atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty in the spirit of the cited demands of Hallstein and Margulies. The West German government succeeded in kindling a debate against the atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty on April 10th 1967 at the EURATOM conference in Brussels. The *Frankfurter Rundschau* remarked on this:

"Federal Foreign Minister Brandt succeeded in securing support for the federal government in the discussion on the planned atomic non-proliferation treaty. At the session of the EURATOM council of ministers in Brussels on Monday far-reaching agreement was reached among five of the six partner states on a joint attitude on this question which is based on Brandt's proposals." (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, Frankfurt-on-Main, April 11th 1967)

NATO General Secretary Brosio was repeatedly asked by West German representatives to mobilize the NATO Council against an atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty. On March 2nd 1967 Kiesinger himself pressed him hard.

The Paris NATO Council session on April 20th then also rejected under the pressure of West German NATO ambassador Grewe

"granting the USA a formal mandate for negotiations with the Soviet Union on a definite treaty text on the atomic stop agreement". (*DPA*, April 20th 1967)

At the NATO Council session in Luxembourg on June 13th and 14th 1967 the West German government continued its wellknown obstructive policy against the atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty.

But the West German government also developed direct hectic activity towards individual NATO states. Scarcely three weeks after his admission to the Kiesinger/Strauss cabinet Brandt asserted on January 5th 1967 in Rome to the British and Italian foreign ministers

"that the non-atomic powers had certain common interests which one must seek to protect". (*UPI*, January 5th 1967)

Kiesinger himself talked in this sense with British and Italian Prime Minister Wilson and Moro who visited Bonn on the occasion of the funeral festivities for Adenauer. Foreign Minister Brandt dealt with Canadian Foreign Secretary Martin. Kiesinger also had talks with Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel who visited Bonn from May 9th to 13th 1967 against the atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty, as is shown by the communiqué on Demirel's visit.

Primarily however the West German government tries to exert an influence on US policy. For this purpose it relies on the Washington-Bonn special alliance and seeks to derive advantage for West Germany's nuclear arms ambitions from the global strategy of US imperialism. During his first official visit to the USA from February 6th to 11th 1967, the *Tagesspiegel*, West Berlin, wrote on February 7th 1967, Brandt should "urgently warn against the conclusion of an atomic non-proliferation treaty with Moscow".

In awareness of the situation in Bonn the paper wrote:

"There are many signs that indicate that Washington had expected less opposition to the atomic non-proliferation treaty from the new federal government than from the Erhard cabinet. Instead, however, the considerations and objections from Bonn have increased."

Foreign Minister Brandt conferred in this spirit with President Johnson, Vice-President Humphrey and Secretary of State Rusk. A conversation with US Defence Secretary McNamara on February 9th 1967 also concentrated on the atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty. In speeches on February 9th before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, and on February 10th on the opening of the Adlai Stevenson Institute on International Affairs in Chicago, Brandt tried to solicit support for the West German attitude towards the non-proliferation treaty. At a press conference in New York on February 10th 1967 West German Foreign Minister Brandt declared in the big-mouthed manner of Bonn:

"in his talks with the American government he felt himself representing not only

the Federal Republic but also a number of other states which do not have atomic weapons of their own." (*UPI*, February 10th 1967)

On March 1st industrialist Erik Blumenfeld, chairman of the Hamburg CDU, member of the Bundestag, was sent to New York to win public opinion. Speaking to press representatives Blumenfeld emphasized that during his "private journey" he had reproached high American government officials for not having "adequately consulted" the West German government prior to the submission of the draft treaty in Geneva. The CDU politician demanded that "our point of view should be taken into consideration." Accordingly the possibility of establishing a Western European atomic strike force should remain "untouched" by an atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty. (*UPI*, March 2nd 1967)

On March 4th 1967 Kiesinger repeated the West German objections in a conversation with American special envoy John McCloy, in Stuttgart.

Only a few days later – on March 9th 1967 – West German Federal Chancellor Kiesinger spoke to the American disarmament expert, Ambassador Foster in the same spirit. On that occasion Kiesinger emphasized the West German demands.

The disruptive manoeuvres were continued by a delegation of the Military Committee of the West German Bundestag, headed by the CDU deputy Rommerskirchen, to Washington in the middle of March 1967, in their consultations with American government officials.

Kiesinger also continued his attacks against the atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty in his talk with US Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey in Bonn on April 5th 1967. Under the heading: "Kiesinger warns USA: don't precipitate atomic non-proliferation treaty," *Die Welt* reported on the talks:

"Federal Chancellor Kiesinger in his talk with American Vice-President Hubert Humphrey emphasized that no one could base his considerations on the assumption that the signature of (West) Germany under the envisaged atomic non-proliferation treaty was a certain thing..."

"Kiesinger used his talks with Humphrey to destroy the illusions that the race had already been won in regard to the thorny question of the atomic non-proliferation treaty..." (*Die Welt*, Hamburg, April 6th 1967)

The so-called disarmament commissioner and observer of the Bonn government at the disarmament talks in Geneva, Schnippenkötter, conducted secret talks in Washington with US government representatives on the draft agreement at the head of a delegation of experts from April 10th to 14th 1967. According to West German press reports Schnippenkötter on that occasion submitted a list of 50 objections and "amendment proposals" on certain articles of the treaty.

In the presence of US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and State Secretary in the West German Federal Chancery Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, Kiesinger demanded of Johnson on April 24th in Bonn that the US government should keep in mind the interests of its allies in making its decisions. On April 26th Kiesinger and Johnson had private talks in which they discussed the West German claims to atomic weapons and the objections of the Bonn government to an atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty.

Die Welt observed in regard to those talks:

"The hopes of Washington for speedy agreement with the Federal Republic on the atomic non-proliferation treaty have been screwed one peg lower than before Johnson's departure for Bonn following the talks between the American President and Federal Chancellor Kiesinger..."

"Johnson could make no headway on the question of the non-proliferation treaty... the time lost in this connection has called forth obvious discontent at the White House." (*Die Welt*, Hamburg, April 28th 1967)

The West German disruptive manoeuvres reached a climax with the journey of West German Federal Chancellor Kiesinger to the USA in August of this year. The West German monopoly press revealed what the Bonn Chancellor presented to the US president:

"In the discussion on the non-proliferation treaty the Americans were left in no doubt as to the fact that their negotiators in Geneva... had strained the (West) German readiness to make concessions to the utmost extent." (*Die Welt*, Hamburg, August 16th 1967)

On August 15th Brandt emphatically insisted in a talk with US Secretary of State Rusk that the West German government would "adhere to its objections against the discussed draft treaty". (*DPA*, August 16th 1967)

2. Bonn's Policy of Extortion in Regard to Other States, in Particular with Non-aligned States

In addition to its conspiracy with the NATO states, the West German government also developed a lively diplomatic activity with a view to inciting other states, in particular non-aligned states, against the treaty.

As early as in January 1967 *Die Welt* reported in this connection:

"Bonn has taken up an intense exchange of opinions with the other non-nuclear industrial states... A dense veil of secrecy conceals a lively diplomatic activity; talks between diplomats, exchanges of letters, consultations conducted in part over several days by (West) German ambassadors are the means of this exchange of views between (West) Germany, Italy, Sweden, Japan, Canada, Israel and above all with the USA." (*Die Welt*, Hamburg, January 28th 1967)

India was also included in this exchange. According to a report in the Indian weekly *Blitz* of February 18th 1967, Bonn had even offered money to India for development projects if India would support the West German opposition to the atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty.

Majonica, foreign policy expert of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, called upon the non-nuclear states on February 15th in the CDU Press Service, to proceed jointly against an atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty:

"The non-nuclear nations will be able to make their voices heard only if they act in common. Joint action would also reduce the suspicion that narrow national, limited interests were at issue... A coordination of that kind... should be organized. A general secretariat could be set up to coordinate, collect and pass on information and prepare joint steps if they should appear to be necessary."

West German Chancellor Kiesinger in an interview with the West German radio on February 21st 1967 confirmed that Bonn had undertaken systematic démarches towards a number of states:

"Our endeavours are still in progress. I expect that they will be successful, since we are able to represent our own interests jointly with the other non-nuclear powers affected by the treaty. All these countries have a common vital concern." (*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, February 22nd 1967)

The general secretary of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Pio Correra, was worked on in this direction by West German State Secretary Schütz on February 9th. In April West German representatives made an attempt in Bonn to win the State Secretary Iha of the Indian Foreign Ministry, and in Geneva Indian Foreign Minister Chagla against the treaty. The talks between West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt and Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki on May 12th also centred around Bonn's wishes against the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. (*Die Welt*, May 13th 1967). The communiqué on the West German-Japanese talks contained the following statement:

"The ministers discussed their attitudes towards a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons." (*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, May 17th 1967)

According to *Die Welt*, West German and Japanese interests allegedly coincided in other points:

"The treaty should lay down obligations not only for the nuclear have-nots, but also for the atomic powers. The legitimate security interests of the non-nuclear states must be protected." (*Die Welt*, Hamburg, May 13th 1967)

Concerning the results of the talks conducted by Brandt in Japan the *Handelsblatt* admitted that

"the critical position of Japan in regard to some paragraphs of the draft (of the atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty—editor) had presumably been formed in part as a result of (West) German initiative". (*Handelsblatt*, Düsseldorf, May 16th 1967)

In the middle of May 1967 West German State Secretary Schütz of the Foreign Office travelled to several countries in East and South East Asia. In an interview Schütz indicated that the atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty had been "discussed" on those occasions. (*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, May 23rd 1967)

In May 1967 Bonn tried to win over Hiroto Tanaka, member of the Japanese Committee on Questions of Atomic Energy and disarmament expert of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, to the West German disruptive position.

From June 20th to 26th 1967 West German Foreign Minister Brandt tried to pin down the governments of Finland, Sweden, Norway and Iceland to the course followed by Bonn. Brandt declared:

"he had had an opportunity to indicate certain aspects to the Swedes which were in favour of maintaining EURATOM and its cooperation with the international atomic organization in Vienna." (*DPA*, June 26th 1967)

The *Frankfurter Rundschau* had established the far-reaching failure of that campaign as early as February 24th:

"Swedish political circles are becoming increasingly irritated by being considered as

allies and being used as an alibi by hysterical and unobjective opponents of the non-proliferation treaty in the Federal Republic . . . The impression is being created that certain West German circles are trying to take political advantage of the honest endeavours made for genuine disarmament and relaxation for their own political designs."

The Indian chief delegate at the Geneva Disarmament Conference also emphasized that

"India and the other non-aligned countries did not intend to form a bloc of opposition to the non-proliferation treaty under West German leadership". (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, February 23rd 1967)

While, over many months, the West German government succeeded in thwarting the signing of a non-proliferation treaty by means of a carefully thought-out system of co-ordinate attempts at defamation on the one hand and false asseverations in favour of disarmament on the other, there are now comparatively favourable conditions for an agreement on this question which is so highly important to international security. Today, the material, legal and technical prerequisites for the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are given.

Faced with the fact that in the long run neither hypocritical demagogic nor blackmailing can lead to the success hoped for in the struggle against the atomic weapons non-proliferation treaty, the government of the West German Federal Republic now employs barrage fire. This is yet another proof of the fact that those who prepare aggressions by ignoring definite frontiers binding in international law, who claim lawful territories of other sovereign states as their own with the intention to annex them and who, at the same time, are greedy of nuclear weapons in order to implement their revanchist schemes, are international trouble-makers. In logical consequence they isolate themselves from the community of the peoples striving for peace and security. But, Europe and the world need peace and security. This is what the interests and the practical policy of the GDR aim at.

Willi Stoph, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic, once again pointed out in his policy statement of July 14th 1967 that especially measures to guarantee European security should be underpinned by relevant agreements between the governments of the two German states in the field of disarmament. It is both a moral and a legal obligation for the two German states to make a special contribution to disarmament. Therefore, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the

GDR repeated the proposal submitted by the Council of State and the Council of Ministers of the GDR to the Bonn government to make contractual arrangements on the following steps:

- Reduction of the arms expenditure in both German states by one half each;
- Renunciation by both German states of the possession, control or participation in the control of nuclear arms in any form;
- Willingness of both German states to join a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

And, now as before, the demand made on November 10th 1966 by Herr Otto Winzer, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, on the West German government is of topical interest, i.e. "to abstain from any action that would be conducive to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or obstructive to the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons".

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